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The	  Non-­‐Redundant	  Contributions	  of	  Marr’s	  Three	  Levels	  of	  Analysis	  for	  Explaining	  Information	  Processing	  Mechanisms	  	   William	  Bechtel	  and	  Oron	  Shagrir	  	  Abstract	  	  Are	  all	  three	  of	  Marr’s	  levels	  needed?	  Should	  they	  be	  kept	  distinct?	  We	  argue	  for	  the	  distinct	  contributions	  and	  methodologies	  of	  each	  level	  of	  analysis.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  maintain	  them	  because	  they	  provide	  three	  different	  perspectives	  required	  to	  understand	  mechanisms,	  especially	  information	  processing	  mechanisms.	  The	  computational	  perspective	  provides	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  mechanism	  functions	  in	  broader	  environments	  that	  determine	  the	  computations	  it	  needs	  to	  perform	  (and	  may	  fail	  to	  perform).	  The	  representation	  and	  algorithmic	  perspective	  offer	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  information	  about	  the	  environment	  is	  encoded	  within	  the	  mechanism	  and	  what	  are	  the	  patterns	  of	  organization	  that	  enable	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  mechanism	  to	  produce	  the	  phenomenon.	  The	  implementation	  perspective	  yields	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  neural	  details	  of	  the	  mechanism	  and	  how	  they	  constrain	  function	  and	  algorithms.	  Once	  we	  adequately	  characterize	  the	  distinct	  role	  of	  each	  level	  of	  analysis,	  it	  is	  fairly	  straightforward	  to	  see	  how	  they	  relate.	  	  	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  The	  term	  level	  is	  used	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  ways.	  One	  use	  refers	  to	  levels	  of	  organization—a	  whole	  system	  is	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  than	  the	  parts	  that	  constitutes	  it	  and	  the	  activities	  the	  whole	  performs	  are	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  than	  those	  of	  its	  components	  (Craver	  &	  Bechtel,	  2007).	  This	  is	  not	  the	  use	  Marr	  (1982)	  had	  in	  mind	  in	  distinguishing	  the	  computational,	  representational	  and	  algorithmic,	  and	  implementational	  levels.	  These	  are	  levels	  of	  analysis,	  not	  levels	  of	  organization	  and	  so,	  contrary	  to	  French	  et	  al.	  (this	  issue),	  Marr	  is	  not	  addressing	  topics	  such	  as	  the	  emergence	  of	  higher	  levels.	  The	  main	  question	  raised	  by	  the	  various	  papers	  in	  this	  issue	  is	  whether	  all	  three	  types	  of	  analysis	  are	  required	  and,	  if	  so,	  how	  they	  relate.	  The	  question	  of	  how	  they	  relate,	  we	  will	  argue,	  is	  fairly	  straightforward	  once	  we	  (1)	  characterize	  the	  distinctive	  role	  of	  each	  type	  of	  analysis	  and	  (2)	  show	  how	  each	  type	  of	  analysis	  makes	  an	  important,	  non-­‐redundant	  contribution	  to	  understanding	  information	  processing	  mechanisms.	  	  As	  the	  explanatory	  relevance	  of	  the	  implementational	  level	  is	  generally	  not	  contested,	  we	  will	  not	  dwell	  on	  it.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  mechanistic	  framework	  of	  explanation,	  it	  specifies	  the	  parts	  (e.g.,	  neurons)	  and	  operations	  (excitation	  or	  inhibition	  of	  other	  neurons)	  that	  are	  employed	  or	  recruited	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  interest.	  Challenges	  to	  Marr’s	  conception	  of	  levels	  focus	  on	  the	  representational	  and	  algorithmic	  and	  the	  computational	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  The	  idea	  of	  algorithms	  governing	  the	  transformations	  of	  representations	  is	  familiar	  from	  computer	  science	  but,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  representations	  and	  algorithms	  used	  in	  digital	  computers.	  Rather,	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  
identification	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  mechanism	  that	  explains	  how	  representations	  are	  manipulated	  to	  generate	  the	  phenomenon.	  We	  will	  show	  how	  this	  contributes	  to	  explaining	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  not	  redundant	  with	  what	  is	  explained	  at	  the	  implementation	  level.	  The	  most	  distinctive,	  and	  least	  well	  understood,	  of	  Marr’s	  three	  types	  of	  analysis	  is	  the	  computational	  level.	  As	  we	  will	  argue,	  Marr	  was	  not	  concerned	  just	  to	  specify	  the	  function	  being	  computed,	  but	  to	  explain	  why	  this	  function	  needs	  to	  be	  computed.	  This	  requires	  looking	  outside	  the	  mechanism	  to	  the	  environment	  and	  to	  the	  tasks	  that	  need	  to	  be	  performed	  in	  that	  environment.	  We	  begin	  with	  the	  computational	  level,	  then	  turn	  to	  the	  representation	  and	  algorithm	  level.	  	  
2.	  The	  Computational	  Level	  
	  Marr's	  notion	  of	  computational-­‐level	  theory	  has	  received	  a	  variety	  of	  interpretations	  (Shagrir	  &	  Bechtel,	  in	  press).	  Many	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  computational	  level	  aims	  at	  stating	  the	  cognitive	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained;	  the	  explanation	  itself	  is	  then	  provided	  at	  the	  algorithmic	  and	  implementation	  levels	  (Bermúdez,	  2005;	  Hardcastle,	  this	  volume;	  Ramsey,	  2007).	  Others	  have	  lumped	  together	  the	  computational	  and	  algorithmic	  levels,	  describing	  them	  as	  sketches	  that	  are	  “elliptical	  or	  incomplete	  mechanistic	  explanations”	  (Piccinini	  &	  Craver,	  2011,	  p.	  284)	  to	  be	  later	  filled	  in	  by	  full-­‐blown	  mechanistic	  explanations.	  Yet	  others	  have	  associated	  the	  computational	  level	  with	  an	  idealized	  competence	  and	  the	  algorithmic	  and	  implementation	  levels	  with	  actual	  performance	  (Craver,	  2007;	  Frixione,	  2001;	  Horgan	  &	  Tienson,	  1994;	  Thomas	  W.	  Polger,	  2004;	  for	  a	  teleological	  variant,	  see	  Anderson,	  this	  volume).	  Finally,	  Egan	  (2010)	  associates	  the	  computational	  level	  with	  an	  explanatory	  formal	  theory,	  which	  mainly	  specifies	  the	  computed	  mathematical	  function	  (see	  also	  van	  Rooij,	  2008).	  	  	  	  Proponents	  of	  Bayesian	  optimality	  analysis	  often	  refer	  to	  Marr,	  emphasizing	  that	  their	  "focus	  is	  on	  computational-­‐level	  theories,	  characterizing	  the	  functional	  capacities	  of	  human	  inference	  rather	  than	  specific	  psychological	  processes	  that	  implement	  those	  functions	  (Tenenbaum,	  Griffiths,	  &	  Kemp,	  2006,	  p.	  206).	  This	  level	  of	  analysis,	  they	  say,	  "is	  focused	  entirely	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  being	  solved	  –	  there	  is	  no	  commitment	  concerning	  how	  the	  cognitive	  system	  actually	  attempts	  to	  solve	  (or	  approximately	  to	  solve)	  the	  problem"	  (Chater,	  Tenenbaum,	  &	  Yuille,	  2006,	  p.	  290).	  While	  this	  probabilistic	  viewpoint	  might	  fit	  with	  each	  of	  interpretations	  above,	  it	  seems	  closest	  to	  the	  last	  two	  interpretations.	  According	  to	  this	  viewpoint,	  probabilistic	  models	  of	  cognition	  provide	  explanatory	  mathematical	  theories	  of	  a	  cognitive	  capacity	  without	  referring	  to	  specific	  psychological	  and	  neural	  mechanisms.	  	  	  We	  have	  defended	  a	  different	  interpretation	  (Shagrir,	  2010;	  Shagrir	  &	  Bechtel,	  in	  press)	  that	  	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  Marr's	  notion	  of	  computational	  analysis.	  	  Marr	  characterizes	  the	  computational	  type	  of	  analysis	  as	  specifying	  “what	  the	  device	  does	  and	  why”	  (1982,	  p.	  22).	  Whereas	  most	  commentators	  have	  addressed	  only	  the	  what	  aspect,	  Marr	  insists	  it	  includes	  the	  why	  aspect	  whose	  aim	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  computed	  function	  in	  the	  physical	  world	  (1977,	  p.	  37).	  Marr	  associates	  this	  why	  aspect	  with	  what	  he	  calls	  physical	  constraints,	  which	  are	  physical	  facts	  and	  features	  in	  the	  physical	  
environment	  of	  the	  perceiving	  individual	  (1982,	  p.	  22-­‐23).	  These	  are	  constraints	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  they	  limit	  the	  range	  of	  functions	  that	  the	  system	  could	  compute	  to	  perform	  a	  given	  visual	  task	  successfully.	  	  	  	  What	  exactly	  are	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  physical	  constraints	  and	  the	  computed	  function?	  How	  do	  these	  constraints	  substantiate	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  computed	  function	  in	  the	  physical	  world?	  The	  gist	  of	  our	  interpretation	  is	  that	  Marr	  assumes	  implicitly	  that	  the	  visual	  system	  mirrors	  or	  preserves	  certain	  structural	  relations	  in	  the	  visual	  field.	  By	  
structural	  relations	  we	  mean	  "high	  order"	  mathematical,	  geometrical	  or	  other	  formal	  relations.	  The	  visual	  system	  would	  preserve	  these	  relations	  if	  there	  were	  an	  isomorphic	  mapping	  from	  the	  visual	  system	  onto	  the	  visual	  field;	  more	  realistically	  we	  talk	  about	  homomorphism	  or	  partial-­‐isomorphism	  and	  acknowledge	  that	  even	  these	  mappings	  involve	  a	  vast	  amount	  of	  approximation	  and	  idealization	  so	  that	  a	  precise	  morphism	  relation	  never	  actually	  obtains.	  	  Nonetheless,	  our	  claim	  is	  that	  a	  computational	  analysis	  appeals	  to	  the	  physical	  constraints	  in	  order	  to	  underscore	  these	  morphism	  relations,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  play	  both	  explanatory	  and	  methodological	  roles	  in	  theories	  of	  vision.	  Explanatorily	  they	  serve	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  appropriateness	  and	  adequacy	  of	  the	  computed	  function	  to	  the	  information-­‐processing	  task	  (Marr,	  1982,	  pp.	  24-­‐25).	  Methodologically	  they	  serve	  to	  guide	  discovery	  of	  the	  function	  that	  the	  visual	  system	  computes	  (Hildreth	  &	  Ullman,	  1989).	  	  	  Marr	  never	  discusses	  isomorphism	  or	  structural	  similarities	  explicitly.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  have	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  central	  to	  his	  computational	  analysis	  of	  edge	  detection	  and	  stereo	  vision	  (Shagrir,	  2010;	  Shagrir	  &	  Bechtel,	  in	  press).	  Thus	  to	  take	  the	  theory	  of	  edge-­‐detection,	  early	  visual	  processes	  compute	  the	  zero-­‐crossings	  of	  (Laplacian)	  second	  derivative	  filterization	  of	  the	  retinal	  images.	  These	  mathematical	  relations	  reflect	  sharp	  changes	  in	  light	  reflection	  in	  the	  visual	  field	  that	  often	  occur	  along	  physical	  edges	  such	  as	  object	  boundaries	  (whereas	  the	  latter	  changes	  can	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  extreme	  points	  of	  first-­‐derivatives	  or	  zero-­‐crossings	  of	  second	  derivatives	  of	  the	  reflection	  function).	  This	  physical	  fact	  ("constraint")	  –	  that	  sharp	  changes	  in	  reflection	  often	  occurs	  along	  physical	  edges	  –	  explains	  why	  the	  visual	  system	  computes	  derivation,	  and	  not	  (say)	  factorization	  or	  exponentiation,	  for	  the	  task	  of	  edge-­‐detection.	  It	  also	  guides	  the	  visual	  theorist	  in	  discovering	  the	  mathematical	  function	  that	  the	  system	  computes,	  namely,	  derivation.	  	  	  	  Here	  we	  focus	  briefly	  on	  another,	  non-­‐visual,	  example—the	  neural	  integrator	  in	  the	  oculomotor	  system.	  This	  example	  indicates	  that	  Marr's	  notion	  of	  computational	  analysis	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  vision	  but	  is	  widely	  applicable	  in	  computational	  cognitive	  neuroscience.	  	  	  The	  neural	  integrator	  converts	  eye-­‐velocity	  inputs	  to	  eye-­‐position-­‐outputs,	  and	  thus	  enables	  the	  oculomotor	  system	  to	  move	  the	  eyes	  to	  the	  right	  position	  (Robinson,	  1989;	  Leigh	  &	  Zee,	  2006).	  The	  inputs	  arrive	  from	  fibers	  coding	  vestibular,	  saccadic	  or	  pursuit	  movements	  (figure	  1);	  the	  system	  produces	  eye-­‐position	  codes	  by	  computing	  mathematical	  integration	  over	  these	  eye-­‐velocity	  encoded	  inputs.	  	  In	  cats,	  monkeys,	  and	  goldfish,	  the	  network	  that	  computes	  horizontal	  eye	  movements	  appears	  to	  be	  localized	  in	  two	  brainstem	  nuclei,	  the	  nucleus	  prepositushypoglossi	  (NPH)	  and	  the	  medial	  vestibular	  nucleus	  (MVN).	  	  
	  Figure	  1:	  The	  neural	  integrator	  (NI)	  receives	  eye-­‐velocity	  coded	  inputs,	  Ė,	  and,	  computing	  integration,	  produces	  eye-­‐velocity	  coded	  outputs,	  E.	  The	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  the	  integrator	  is	  common	  to	  vestibular,	  saccadic	  and	  pursuit	  movements,	  thus	  receiving	  vestibular	  (Ėv),	  saccadic	  (Ėr),	  and	  pursuit	  (Ėp),	  velocity	  coded	  inputs.	  On	  the	  right	  it	  is	  shown	  how	  the	  head	  velocity	  signals,	  Ḣ	  are	  converted	  into	  eye-­‐velocity	  codes	  (Ėv).	  These	  codes	  are	  projected	  directly	  to	  the	  motoneurons	  (mn)	  that	  have	  to	  produce	  velocity	  commands,	  but	  also	  the	  neural	  integrator	  (NI)	  which	  produces	  position	  codes	  projected	  to	  the	  motoneurons	  	  for	  position	  commands	  (from	  Robinson	  1989,	  p.	  35).	  	  	  Mathematical	  integration	  characterizes	  operations	  performed	  in	  two	  very	  different	  places.	  One	  is	  in	  the	  neural	  representing	  system,	  namely,	  the	  neural	  integrator.	  It	  performs	  integration	  on	  the	  neural	  inputs	  to	  generate	  neural	  commands.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  system	  is	  known	  as	  integrator.	  Another	  and	  very	  different	  place,	  however,	  is	  in	  the	  target	  domain	  being	  represented,	  in	  our	  case	  the	  eyes.	  The	  relation	  between	  position	  and	  velocity	  of	  the	  eye	  can	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  integration	  too!	  The	  distance	  between	  the	  previous	  and	  current	  positions	  of	  the	  eye	  is	  determined	  by	  integrating	  over	  its	  velocity	  with	  respect	  to	  time.	  So	  what	  we	  have	  here	  is	  an	  (iso-­‐)morphism	  between	  the	  representing	  sensory-­‐motor	  neural	  system	  (the	  integrator)	  and	  the	  represented	  target	  domain	  (the	  eyes	  and	  their	  properties).	  The	  neural	  integrator	  mirrors	  or	  preserves	  certain	  relations	  in	  the	  target	  domain,	  namely	  the	  distances	  between	  two	  successive	  eye	  positions.	  By	  computing	  integration,	  the	  neural	  function	  mirrors,	  reflects	  or	  preserves	  the	  integration	  relation	  between	  eye	  velocity	  and	  eye	  positions.	  	  	  	  Let	  us	  put	  these	  findings	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Marr's	  notion	  of	  computational	  analysis.	  The	  
what	  aspect	  describes	  the	  mathematical	  function,	  integration,	  computed	  by	  the	  neural	  integrator.	  The	  why	  aspect	  relates	  the	  computed	  function	  with	  the	  physical	  environment,	  namely,	  the	  eyes	  with	  their	  properties.	  The	  analysis	  invokes	  a	  physical	  constraint,	  which	  in	  our	  case	  is	  the	  relation	  between	  eye-­‐velocity	  and	  the	  distance	  between	  successive	  eye-­‐positions.	  Using	  this	  constraint,	  it	  is	  shown	  that	  there	  is	  a	  morphism	  mapping	  relation	  between	  the	  neural	  function	  and	  the	  target	  domain.	  This	  mapping	  relation	  is	  underscored	  
by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  two	  domains	  have	  a	  shared	  structure,	  which	  is	  mathematical	  integration.	  	  	  	  As	  said,	  the	  morphism	  relation	  plays	  both	  explanatory	  and	  methodological	  roles.	  On	  the	  explanatory	  side,	  it	  serves	  to	  explain	  why	  computing	  integration	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  task	  of	  controlling	  eye	  movement.	  The	  neural	  network	  computes	  integration	  and	  not,	  say,	  multiplication,	  exponentiation,	  or	  factorization,	  because	  integration	  preserves	  the	  integration	  relation	  between	  eye	  movement	  and	  eye	  positions	  in	  the	  target	  domain.	  Factorizing	  numbers	  would	  not	  result	  in	  moving	  the	  eyes	  to	  the	  right	  place,	  precisely	  because	  it	  does	  not	  preserve	  relations	  in	  the	  target	  domain	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  eye	  movements.	  Integration	  does:	  When	  you	  compute	  integration	  over	  eye-­‐velocity	  encoded	  inputs,	  you	  mirror	  the	  integration	  relation	  between	  velocity	  and	  position;	  hence,	  you	  output	  representations	  of	  a	  new	  eye	  position.	  The	  algorithmic	  and	  implementation	  levels	  complement	  this	  explanation	  by	  specifying	  how	  this	  integration	  function	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  neural	  system.	  	  	  On	  the	  methodological	  side,	  the	  morphism	  relation	  is	  instrumental	  in	  discovering	  what	  function	  is	  computed.	  In	  our	  example,	  experimental	  electrophysiological	  results	  indicated	  that	  the	  neural	  system	  converts	  eye-­‐velocity	  pulses	  into	  eye-­‐position	  codes.	  Looking	  at	  the	  relation	  ("physical	  constraint")	  between	  the	  represented	  velocity	  and	  position,	  theoreticians	  quickly	  inferred	  that	  the	  internal	  relations	  between	  the	  representing	  states	  must	  be	  of	  integration.	  This	  logic	  of	  discovery	  assumes	  that	  the	  computed	  function	  is	  that	  of	  integration	  since	  the	  computed	  function	  must	  correspond	  to	  the	  velocity-­‐position	  integration	  relation,	  which	  is	  already	  known.	  	  	  How	  does	  this	  interpretation	  relate	  to	  the	  Bayesian	  approach	  to	  cognition?	  It	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  because	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  multiple	  Bayesian	  approaches	  (Jones	  &	  Love,	  2011).	  We	  will	  make	  few	  preliminary	  points.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  both	  Marr	  and	  the	  Bayesians	  hold	  the	  conviction	  that	  theories	  of	  cognition	  go	  above	  and	  beyond	  mechanisms,	  whether	  algorithms	  or	  their	  neural	  implementations.	  And	  they	  both	  think	  that	  the	  computational	  analysis	  of	  the	  task	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  psychological	  and	  neural	  mechanisms;	  rather	  it	  highlights	  and	  identifies	  non-­‐mechanistic	  elements	  of	  a	  cognitive	  phenomenon.	  Marr	  and	  the	  Bayesians	  are	  also	  in	  full	  agreement	  that	  this	  computational	  analysis	  ideally	  produces	  mathematical	  or	  formal	  descriptions,	  and	  that	  these	  descriptions	  are	  explanatory.	  	  	  Another	  point	  of	  convergence	  between	  Marr	  and	  the	  Bayesians	  is	  that	  computational	  analysis	  provides	  some	  sort	  of	  an	  optimal	  solution	  to	  the	  problem.	  Marr	  says	  that	  computational	  theories	  state	  "that	  what	  is	  being	  computed	  is	  optimal	  in	  some	  sense"	  (p.	  19),	  and	  he	  compares	  Chomsky's	  notion	  of	  competence	  with	  his	  computational	  theories	  (p.	  28).	  Bayesian	  models	  aim	  to	  show	  how	  a	  problem	  can	  be	  solved	  in	  principle,	  which	  amounts	  to	  how	  rational	  agents	  should	  update	  their	  beliefs	  in	  light	  of	  new	  data	  (Griffiths,	  Kemp,	  &	  Tenenbaum,	  2008).	  Despite	  the	  similarities,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  difference—Marr's	  theories	  aim	  at	  the	  characterization	  of	  the	  real	  (even	  if	  idealized)	  mathematical	  function	  computed	  by	  the	  cognitive	  system,	  whereas	  the	  Bayesians	  models	  aim	  at	  the	  characterization	  of	  the	  function	  that	  the	  cognitive	  system	  should	  compute	  and	  assumes	  that	  the	  actual	  cognitive	  system	  approximates	  this	  solution.	  	  
	  A	  further	  point	  of	  divergence	  concerns	  the	  elements	  that	  are	  being	  included	  in	  computational	  models.	  Marr	  definitely	  assumes	  that	  some	  elements	  at	  the	  computational	  level	  are	  representations.	  However,	  he	  thinks	  that	  questions	  about	  kinds	  of	  representations	  belong	  to	  the	  algorithmic	  level.	  To	  use	  his	  example	  of	  an	  adding	  machine,	  the	  computational	  level	  specifies	  that	  the	  machine	  computes	  addition;	  part	  of	  the	  specification	  is	  that	  the	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  represent	  numbers.	  But	  whether	  the	  machine	  uses	  Arabic,	  Roman	  or	  binary	  representational	  system	  is	  a	  question	  left	  to	  the	  algorithmic	  level	  (Marr,	  1982,	  p.	  20ff).	  Bayesians,	  it	  seems	  to	  us,	  put	  more	  emphasis	  on	  the	  kind	  and	  structure	  of	  representations	  involved	  in	  cognitive	  functions,	  and	  their	  models	  often	  refer	  to	  internal	  representational	  structures.	  For	  example,	  they	  show	  that	  relations	  between	  different	  biological	  species	  could	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  tree,	  a	  ring,	  a	  set	  of	  clusters,	  or	  a	  low	  dimensional	  space	  (Griffiths,	  Chater,	  Kemp,	  Perfors,	  &	  Tenenbaum,	  2010).	  	  What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  the	  computational	  analysis?	  Jones	  and	  Love	  (2011)	  argued	  that	  the	  Bayesians	  downplay	  the	  role	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  their	  analysis.	  Chater,	  Goodman,	  Griffiths,	  Kemp,	  Oaksford,	  and	  Tenenbaum	  (2011)	  responded	  that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  Bayesian	  analysis	  is	  often	  based,	  explicitly,	  on	  assumptions	  about	  environmental	  structure.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  Bayesian	  conception	  of	  computational	  analysis	  might	  not	  be	  very	  different	  from	  Marr's	  (as	  we	  interpreted	  him).	  But	  our	  interpretation	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  the	  analysis.	  We	  have	  shown,	  first,	  that	  the	  environment	  underlies	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  computational	  analysis.	  The	  explanatory	  role	  of	  the	  environment	  extends	  to	  the	  Bayesians	  examples	  as	  well.	  A	  directed	  graph	  is	  a	  better	  model	  of	  the	  properties	  generated	  by	  a	  causal	  transmission	  process	  (Tenenbaum,	  Griffiths,	  &	  Kemp,	  2006)	  precisely	  because	  a	  directed	  graph	  preserves	  the	  formal	  structure	  of	  the	  causal	  process,	  whereas	  (say)	  a	  taxonomic	  tree	  does	  not.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  environment	  also	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  fixing	  the	  appropriate	  mathematical	  description.	  Chater	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  say	  that	  what	  is	  distinctive	  about	  Bayesian	  approach	  is	  "a	  top-­‐down,	  or	  'function-­‐first'	  research	  strategy,	  as	  recommended	  by	  Marr	  (1982):	  from	  computational,	  to	  algorithmic,	  to	  implementational	  levels"	  (p.	  196;	  see	  also	  Griffith	  et	  al.	  2010).	  They	  give	  as	  an	  example	  a	  pocket	  calculator	  that	  uses	  input	  and	  output	  symbols	  we	  do	  not	  well	  understand.	  Their	  claim	  is	  that	  we	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  understand	  what	  algorithms	  are	  carried	  out	  if	  we	  first	  realize	  that	  the	  system	  computes	  addition	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  This	  claim	  is	  certainly	  in	  accord	  with	  Marr's	  approach.	  The	  question,	  however,	  is	  how	  do	  we	  figure	  out	  that	  the	  system	  computes	  addition	  and	  not	  another	  function.	  Marr's	  answer	  is	  that	  when	  we	  study	  cognitive	  systems	  we	  use	  cues	  from	  the	  environment	  that	  constrain	  the	  computed	  function.	  We	  see	  that	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  encoded	  velocity	  and	  the	  encoded	  position	  is	  that	  of	  integration	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  neural	  system	  is	  an	  integrator.	  Marr	  was	  overly	  optimistic	  about	  this	  method,	  thinking	  that	  the	  environmental	  constraints	  are	  always	  apparent	  to	  us;	  however,	  it	  is	  often	  not	  the	  case	  (Shagrir	  &	  Bechtel,	  in	  press).	  In	  this	  respect,	  techniques	  developed	  in	  the	  Bayesian	  analysis	  might	  constitute	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  proposed	  function-­‐first	  methodology	  (Yuille	  &	  Kersten,	  2006).	  What	  we	  emphasize,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  prospects	  of	  this	  methodology	  crucially	  depend,	  as	  Marr	  noticed,	  on	  successful	  deployment	  of	  cues	  from	  the	  environment.	  	  
3.	  The	  representation	  and	  algorithm	  level	  	  Those	  authors	  who	  downplay	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  representation	  and	  algorithm	  type	  of	  analysis	  and	  the	  implementation	  type	  of	  analysis	  (Bickle,	  this	  issue;	  Hardcastle,	  this	  issue)	  implicitly	  hold	  that	  the	  specific	  details	  of	  the	  neural	  implementation	  are	  all	  that	  is	  required	  for	  explanation.	  But	  while	  the	  specific	  parts	  and	  operations	  are	  certainly	  relevant	  to	  explaining	  a	  phenomenon,	  they	  are	  not	  the	  only	  relevant	  factors.	  As	  any	  engineer	  or	  designer	  knows,	  it	  is	  also	  crucially	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  parts	  and	  operations	  are	  organized	  and	  how	  this	  organization	  facilitates	  generation	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  Different	  ways	  of	  putting	  the	  same	  parts	  together	  will	  result	  in	  different	  phenomena	  (many	  of	  them	  not	  very	  interesting)	  and	  the	  challenge	  for	  a	  designer	  or	  engineer	  is	  to	  discover	  an	  organizational	  design	  that	  is	  able	  to	  generate	  the	  phenomenon	  they	  desire.	  For	  scientists	  the	  challenge	  is	  much	  the	  same,	  although	  they	  are	  typically	  engaged	  in	  reverse	  engineering—trying	  to	  discover	  the	  organization	  that	  enabled	  the	  parts	  together	  to	  produce	  the	  phenomenon.	  	  	  Someone	  critical	  of	  treating	  the	  representation	  and	  algorithm	  level	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  implementation	  level	  might	  note	  that	  in	  any	  implementation	  a	  particular	  organization	  is	  realized.	  However,	  crucial	  to	  the	  endeavors	  of	  both	  designers	  and	  scientists	  is	  the	  discovery	  of	  design	  principles—patterns	  of	  organization	  that	  produce	  the	  same	  results	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  different	  implementations.	  If	  there	  were	  no	  such	  principles,	  then	  investigators	  would	  have	  to	  analyze	  each	  specific	  mechanism	  to	  determine	  its	  effects	  by,	  for	  example,	  representing	  the	  important	  properties	  of	  all	  of	  its	  parts	  and	  their	  interactions	  in	  differential	  equations,	  identifying	  the	  correct	  parameters,	  and	  simulating	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  whole.	  To	  explain	  why	  a	  given	  physical	  system	  behaved	  a	  particular	  way	  one	  could	  do	  no	  more	  than	  appeal	  to	  such	  a	  simulation.	  But	  designers	  and	  increasingly	  scientists	  have	  found	  success	  with	  a	  different	  strategy—identifying	  design	  principles	  that	  generate	  the	  same	  phenomenon	  when	  realized	  in	  mechanisms	  composed	  of	  different	  parts	  performing	  different	  operations	  as	  long	  as	  they	  maintain	  the	  required	  relations	  to	  each	  other.	  These	  relations	  are	  often	  presented	  in	  graphs	  in	  which	  nodes	  represent	  entities	  and	  edges	  the	  effects	  of	  specific	  nodes	  on	  others.	  	  	  Identifying	  design	  principles	  requires	  abstracting	  from	  the	  details	  of	  a	  particular	  instantiation	  (Levy	  &	  Bechtel,	  2013).	  A	  graph	  such	  as	  the	  one	  below	  showing	  a	  double-­‐negative	  feedback	  motif	  (Figure	  2)	  does	  not	  indicate	  what	  plays	  the	  roles	  of	  X	  and	  Y,	  only	  that	  each	  inhibits	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  other.	  To	  determine	  what	  will	  happen	  in	  a	  mechanism	  in	  which	  such	  a	  design	  is	  implemented,	  researchers	  turn	  to	  computational	  modeling.	  For	  example,	  after	  finding	  the	  double-­‐negative	  feedback	  motif	  occurring	  frequently	  in	  gene	  regulation	  networks	  in	  eukaryotic	  cells,	  Tyson	  and	  his	  collaborators	  (Tyson,	  Chen,	  &	  Novák,	  2003;	  Tyson	  &	  Novák,	  2010)	  developed	  computational	  models	  and	  demonstrated	  that	  this	  design	  can,	  under	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  parameter	  values,	  generate	  a	  bi-­‐stable	  switch	  that	  requires	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  the	  input	  to	  turn	  on	  but	  will	  only	  turn	  off	  when	  the	  input	  drops	  to	  a	  significantly	  lower	  level.	  This	  is	  particularly	  useful	  in	  forcing	  normally	  reversible	  processes	  to	  operate	  sequentially.	  	  
	  Figure	  2.	  Double-­‐negative	  feedback	  loop	  motif	  	  The	  example	  we	  just	  offered	  is	  from	  molecular	  biology,	  not	  cognitive	  science	  or	  neuroscience.	  Accordingly,	  while	  it	  might	  seem	  that	  one	  can	  describe	  a	  motif	  like	  the	  double-­‐negative	  feedback	  loop	  in	  an	  algorithm,	  it	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  operating	  over	  representations	  and	  involved	  in	  information	  processing.	  As	  such,	  it	  might	  not	  seem	  appropriate	  to	  Marr’s	  level	  of	  analysis.	  But	  in	  fact	  molecular	  biologists	  are	  increasingly	  employing	  information	  processing	  vocabulary	  to	  describe	  circuits	  like	  these	  whose	  parts	  (e.g.,	  transcription	  factors)	  carry	  information	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  processed	  by	  the	  cell	  in	  determining	  its	  responses.	  Moreover,	  very	  similar	  analyses	  are	  currently	  being	  developed	  by	  Sporns	  and	  his	  colleagues	  (Sporns	  &	  Kötter,	  2004;	  Sporns,	  2010)	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  understand	  the	  patterns	  of	  connection	  in	  the	  brain.	  Treating	  whole	  brain	  regions	  as	  units	  (that	  serve	  representational	  functions),	  they	  find	  the	  dual-­‐dyad	  motif	  (Figure	  3)	  occurring	  particularly	  frequently	  in	  contexts	  in	  which	  the	  apex	  node	  is	  a	  hub-­‐region	  that	  has	  an	  especially	  large	  number	  of	  connections	  to	  other	  regions.	  Computational	  analysis	  of	  this	  motif	  reveals	  that	  it	  is	  especially	  effective	  in	  promoting	  synchronization	  of	  activity	  with	  zero	  phase-­‐lag	  across	  long	  distances	  (Vicente,	  Gollo,	  Mirasso,	  Fischer,	  &	  Pipa,	  2008),	  a	  function	  important	  in	  connecting	  regions	  representing	  related	  information	  and	  so	  underlying	  cognitive	  performance.	  
	  Figure	  3.	  Dual-­‐dyad	  motif	  	  We	  have	  identified	  two	  simple	  motifs	  that	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  important	  information	  processing	  functions	  either	  in	  cells	  or	  in	  the	  brain.	  Both	  cell	  and	  brain	  networks	  are	  enormously	  complex,	  and	  identifying	  motifs	  is	  only	  one	  tool	  for	  understanding	  their	  function.	  Other	  tools	  are	  being	  developed	  to	  analyze	  larger	  scale	  networks	  (see	  van	  den	  Heuvel	  &	  Sporns,	  2011,	  for	  discussion	  of	  what	  is	  called	  the	  "rich-­‐club"	  hub	  structure	  in	  the	  primate	  brain).	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  these	  network	  analyses	  abstractly	  characterize	  the	  organization	  in	  the	  mechanism	  and	  use	  computational	  analysis	  to	  determine	  the	  
contribution	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  phenomenon.	  These	  results	  are	  established	  without	  knowing	  what	  entities	  implement	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  nodes	  and	  what	  operations	  implement	  the	  edges.	  Moreover,	  we	  contend	  that	  such	  accounts	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	  type	  of	  analysis	  Marr	  had	  in	  mind	  in	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  representation	  and	  algorithm	  level	  of	  analysis	  and	  differentiating	  it	  from	  the	  implementational	  level.	  	  	  
4.	  Conclusion:	  Relating	  Marr’s	  Levels	  	  In	  the	  two	  previous	  sections	  we	  have	  emphasized	  (1)	  the	  distinctive	  role	  of	  Marr’s	  computational	  and	  representation	  and	  algorithmic	  analyses	  and	  (2)	  shown	  how	  both	  make	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  understanding	  information	  processing	  mechanisms	  that	  is	  non-­‐redundant	  to	  that	  of	  the	  other	  or	  of	  the	  implementation	  level.	  What	  remains	  to	  discuss	  is	  how	  these	  levels	  are	  related.	  Each	  offers	  answers	  to	  different	  questions	  that	  nonetheless	  are	  related	  to	  each	  other.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  recognizing	  that	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  information	  processing	  mechanisms	  and	  that	  understanding	  mechanisms	  requires	  integrating	  different	  pieces	  of	  information.	  First,	  one	  requires	  information	  about	  the	  phenomenon	  being	  explained	  by	  the	  mechanism.	  The	  computation	  level,	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  environment	  from	  which	  organisms	  need	  to	  acquire	  information	  to	  live	  their	  lives,	  specifies	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained.	  Empirical,	  including	  experimental,	  investigation	  at	  this	  level	  is	  crucial	  since	  our	  intuitive	  understanding	  of	  the	  task	  may	  be	  wrong	  and	  if	  it	  is,	  so	  are	  the	  explanations	  offered	  for	  it.	  Second,	  in	  any	  situation	  where	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  individual	  parts	  are	  organized	  in	  a	  complex	  manner,	  explaining	  how	  the	  mechanism	  works	  requires	  understanding	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  organization.	  The	  discovery	  and	  articulation	  of	  design	  principles	  provides	  accounts	  of	  what	  types	  of	  phenomena	  may	  be	  produced	  given	  those	  designs.	  As	  in	  engineering,	  identifying	  the	  relevant	  design	  principles	  and	  understanding	  what	  behavior	  they	  will	  generate	  under	  a	  range	  of	  implementations	  is	  different	  than	  determining	  what	  is	  actually	  performing	  the	  various	  roles	  in	  a	  specific	  mechanism.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  discount	  the	  implementation	  level.	  Since	  not	  every	  implementation	  will	  satisfy	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  algorithm	  (design),	  it	  is	  important	  to	  investigate	  the	  actual	  implementation.	  Moreover,	  many	  features	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  result	  from	  the	  details	  of	  the	  implementation.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  answering	  different	  questions	  about	  a	  mechanism,	  research	  at	  each	  of	  Marr’s	  three	  levels	  of	  analysis	  can	  productively	  constrain	  research	  at	  other	  levels.	  Working	  from	  the	  top-­‐down,	  knowing	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  information	  it	  makes	  available	  to	  the	  organism	  limits	  the	  types	  of	  information	  processing	  algorithms	  that	  can	  utilize	  that	  information.	  Likewise,	  having	  identified	  a	  mode	  of	  organization	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  it	  will	  generate	  a	  form	  of	  behavior	  can	  guide	  the	  search	  for	  the	  components	  that	  implement	  the	  design.	  Constraints	  also	  arise	  from	  the	  bottom	  up.	  Knowing	  features	  of	  the	  implementation	  can	  put	  constraints	  on	  the	  search	  for	  algorithms.	  Some	  algorithms	  might	  not	  be	  implementable	  given	  the	  components	  available,	  and	  alternatives	  must	  be	  sought.	  Likewise,	  knowing	  the	  algorithm	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  functioning	  can	  guide	  investigations	  into	  the	  environment	  and	  reveal	  different	  features	  of	  its	  structure	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  organism.	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